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SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT—SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT PRECLUDES 
COURTS FROM LENGTHENING A PRISON SENTENCE 
SOLELY TO FOSTER OFFENDER REHABILITATION  
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. CT. 2382 (2011) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Tapia v. United States, the Supreme Court held 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) 
prohibits sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison sentence 
to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.  The Court concluded the plain text 
of § 3582(a) tells sentencing courts that imprisonment is an inappropriate 
means of promoting rehabilitation.  This limitation applied not only to the 
decision to impose a prison term, but also to determining its length.  
Therefore, the Court held the district court erred by giving Tapia a longer 
sentence so she could complete a drug treatment program provided by the 
U.S. Bureau of Prisons.  The Court noted, however, § 3582(a) allows 
sentencing courts to discuss the programs available in prison and their 
benefits.  Tapia will significantly impact future sentencing decisions.  In 
particular, this ruling overturns the law of the Eighth Circuit, which held 
sentencing courts could extend, but not impose, a prison term for 
rehabilitative purposes.  In addition, recent First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit 
decisions suggest there is an emerging split on Tapia’s application to 
sentencing upon supervised release. 
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On January 14, 2008, after a border agent discovered two illegal aliens 
hidden in the modified gas tank of Alejandra Tapia’s vehicle, Tapia and her 
friend, Tinamarie Debenedetto, were arrested at the San Ysidro, California 
border crossing.1  A grand jury indicted Tapia for smuggling illegal aliens 
 
1. Brief for United States Supporting Vacatur at 4-5, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 
(2011) (No. 10-5400).  Earlier that day, Tapia agreed to drive the aliens from Mexico to the 
United States.  Id. at 4.  Tapia was later given a Jeep to accomplish this task.  Id.  To allow Tapia 
to secret individuals in the gas tank compartment, the Jeep had been converted to run on an 
alternative fuel source.  Id.  Before departing on the journey, Tapia helped fit the aliens into the 
modified gas tank compartment.  Id. 
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for financial gain and without presentation.2  Following the indictment, the 
district court released her on bond pending further proceedings.3  After 
Tapia missed a court date, a bench warrant was issued for her arrest.4  Six 
months later, officers found Tapia with methamphetamine, a sawed-off 
shotgun, and stolen mail she planned to use for identity theft.5 
At sentencing, the district court calculated a Federal Sentencing 
Guideline6 range of forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment for 
Tapia’s offense.7  In determining the length of Tapia’s sentence, the district 
court considered several factors, including Tapia’s history of physical and 
sexual abuse, her need for correctional treatment, the seriousness of her 
offense, and the need for deterrence.8  The district court sentenced Tapia to 
fifty-one months of imprisonment, with three years of supervised release to 
follow.9  In justifying this sentence, the district court stressed the need for 
the sentence to be long enough for Tapia to qualify for and finish the U.S. 
Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) 500-hour Residential Drug Abuse Program 
(RDAP).10 
When the district court imposed the sentence, Tapia made no 
objections.11  The sentencing judge recommended Tapia be placed in 
Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Dublin,12 “where they ha[d] the 
facilities to really help her.”13  The BOP, however, placed Tapia in a 
different facility and she never enrolled in RDAP.14  On appeal, Tapia 
argued the district court abused its discretion by lengthening her sentence so 
 
2. Id. at 5. 
3. Id. 
4. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (No. 10-5400). 
5. Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 5. 
6. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide federal judges with a set of advisory 
sentencing ranges for federal offenses. See infra Part II.C; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2, available at http://www. 
ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf. 
7. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385. 
8. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 4-5; Brief for United States, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
9. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385. 
10. Id.  RDAP is a nine- to twelve-month drug treatment program.  JANET HINTON, BUREAU 
OF PRISONS RESIDENTIAL DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM REFERENCE CHART 1 (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/2009%0RDAP%20Chart.pdf.  Ordinarily, the offender must have at 
least twenty-four months remaining on his or her sentence in order to be considered for the 
program.  FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS 9, 11 (2009), 
available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5330_011.pdf. 
11. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385. 
12. FCI Dublin is located in Dublin, California.  FCI Dublin, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http:// 
www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/dub/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
13. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2391. 
14. Id.; see also Brief for Stephanos Bibas et. al. as Amicus Curae by Invitation of the Court, 
Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (No. 10-5400). 
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she could complete RDAP.15  According to Tapia, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) 
precludes sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison sentence 
to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.16  The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
Tapia’s sentence.17  Citing its previous holding in United States v. Duran,18 
the Ninth Circuit held § 3582(a) only prohibits a sentencing court from 
considering rehabilitation when making the initial decision to incarcerate.19  
Once that decision is made, however, a court can consider rehabilitative 
factors in calculating the length of the prison sentence.20 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Throughout American history, reformers have run the gamut of 
rehabilitation methods and strategies.21  In the early nineteenth century, 
reformers believed they could rehabilitate offenders through isolation and 
hard labor.22  By the 1950s, activists thought individualized treatment and 
correctional programs could purge the offender of his criminal tendencies.23  
Each reform effort, however, faced the relentless criticism that the treatment 
programs were not working.24  By the 1970s, policymakers rejected the 
rehabilitative model, which set the stage for the enactment of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).25  Thus, an understanding of the 
statutory context of this Act requires a review of American history. 
First, this section will briefly discuss the evolution of American prison 
programs, leading up to the sentencing reform movement of the mid-
1970s.26  Second, this section will track the legislative history of the Act, 
specifically focusing on the role of rehabilitation in incarceration.27  Third, 
this section will provide a brief overview of the relevant law regarding the 
 
15. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. 37 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1994). 
19. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386 (citing Duran, 37 F.3d at 561). 
20. Id. 
21. Michael Braswell, Correctional Treatment and the Human Spirit, in CORRECTIONAL 
COUNSELING AND REHABILITATION 3, 4 (Patricia Van Voorhis et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997). 
22. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 79 
(1993). 
23. See LARRY E. SULLIVAN, THE PRISON REFORM MOVEMENT:  FORLORN HOPE 61-62 
(1990). 
24. See Francis T. Cullen & Brandon K. Applegate, Introduction to OFFENDER 
REHABILITATION, at xiii, xiv-xvi (Francis T. Cullen & Brandon K. Applegate eds., 1997). 
25. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-66 (1989) (briefly discussing the 
genesis of the SRA of 1984). 
26. See infra Part II.A. 
27. See infra Part II.B. 
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines.28  Finally, this section will layout the under-
lying circuit split29 leading up to Tapia v. United States.30 
A. THE HISTORY OF REHABILITATION IN AMERICAN PRISONS 
The Quakers were the earliest Americans to embrace the idea that 
offenders were capable of self-reformation.31  Inspired by this belief, in 
1787, a group of Quakers formed the first prison reform organization, the 
Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons 
(Philadelphia Prison Society), which sought to improve the miserable 
conditions in the public prisons and jails.32  Urged by the Philadelphia 
Prison Society, the state legislature converted the Walnut Street Jail into its 
state prison, which was the first penitentiary in the United States.33 
The Walnut Street Prison opened its doors in 1790.34  Although most 
inmates were housed in large night rooms, violent offenders were placed in 
solitary confinement.35  To pass the time, inmates could participate in 
various vocational programs, such as shoemaking, weaving, and polishing 
marble.36  In addition to these vocational programs, the Walnut Street 
Prison provided inmates with medical care and religious services.37  By 
1798, inmates also had access to a school, which offered reading, writing, 
and arithmetic lessons.38  Reformers hoped the combination of labor and 
reflection would make offenders both contrite and penitent.39  Despite the 
Walnut Street Prison’s initial success,40 overcrowding and prison violence 
forced reformers to dispense with this system.41 
Unfazed by this failure, reformers moved to build massive facilities 
capable of isolating and reforming inmates.42  Both Pennsylvania43 and 
 
28. See infra Part II.C. 
29. See infra Part II.D.  
30. 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). 
31. See SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 5. 
32. See JOHN W. ROBERTS, REFORM AND RETRIBUTION:  AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN PRISONS 24 (1997). 
33. Id. at 26-27. 
34. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 6. 
35. Id. 
36. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 27. 
37. See SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 6. 
38. Ruth-Ellen M. Grimes, Walnut Street Jail, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 
796, 800 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996). 
39. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 26-27. 
40. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 6. 
41. See Grimes, supra note 38, at 801; Matthew W. Meskell, An American Resolution:  The 
History of Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REV. 839, 847-50 (1999). 
42. See THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY:  A HISTORY OF 
CONTROL 53 (2000). 
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New York44 developed rival prison systems that would theoretically isolate 
and reform offenders.45  While both systems sought to separate prisoners 
from one another, the Pennsylvania system took isolation to its extreme.46  
For the entire length of their sentence, prisoners stayed in their individual 
cells where they were expected to eat, work, and sleep.47  New York’s 
Auburn system, on the other hand, took a more moderate approach to isola-
tion.48  Under the Auburn system, prisoners were only isolated at night.49  
During the day, prisoners could eat and work together in congregate work-
shops, but prison policies required prisoners to complete their activities in 
total silence.50 
As these facilities filled to their capacity, however, it became 
impossible to maintain the isolation and discipline these two systems 
required.51  To keep the inmate population at a manageable level, prisons 
pardoned large groups of inmates every year.52  Nevertheless, the recid-
ivism rate of these released prisoners continued to rise.53  Penitentiaries 
were clearly in need of an overhaul.54 
With the Auburn system falling into ruin, the New York Prison 
Association commissioned Enoch Cobb Wines and Theodore Dwight to 
survey and evaluate penitentiaries in the United States and Canada.55  In 
1867, Wines and Dwight compiled their discoveries and recommendations 
 
43. See J.M. MOYNAHAN & EARLE K. STEWART, THE AMERICAN JAIL:  ITS DEVELOPMENT 
AND GROWTH 37 (1980).  Pennsylvania’s first penitentiary, based on the separate system model, 
was the Western Penitentiary in Pittsburgh.  Pennsylvania’s second penitentiary, Eastern 
Penitentiary, was later built at Cherry Hill in Pittsburgh.  Id. 
44. Id. (stating Auburn Prison was built in 1823). 
45. See ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 31. 
46. See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison:  United States, 1789-1865, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON:  THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 118 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995); see also BLOMBERG  & LUCKEN, supra note 42, 
at 53.  For example, officials hooded inmates when they entered jail, when they left their cells, and 
when they were eventually released.  BLOMBERG  & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 53. 
47. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:  SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER 
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 82 (1971). 
48. See id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform:  United States, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF PRISON:  THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY, supra note 46, at 
170.  By 1865, three to four inmates were living in a cell designed for one.  BLOMBERG & 
LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 58.  For example, in 1867, New York’s legislature reported that one-
third of its inmates were housed two to a cell.  Id. 
52. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 58. 
53. See NICOLE HAHN RAFTER & DEBRA L. STANLEY, PRISONS IN AMERICA:  A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK 7 (1999). 
54. See id. 
55. Id. 
          
2011] CASE COMMENT 381 
and published the Report on the Prisons and Reformatories of the United 
States and Canada.56  While they could not find an American penitentiary 
system deserving praise, Wines and Dwight enthusiastically endorsed the 
Irish prison system, developed by Sir Walter Crofton.57  Under the Irish 
system, inmates advanced through a series of grades, which, depending on 
their good conduct, led to their release.58 
Wines and Dwight shared their recommendations and insights at the 
1870 Cincinnati Conference, along with other penal reform advocates, such 
as Franklin Sanborn and Zebulon Brockway.59  To the conference attend-
ees, the Irish prison system was an appealing alternative to the Auburn and 
Pennsylvania prison systems.60  At the conclusion of the conference, the 
National Congress of Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline adopted the 
“Declaration of Principles,” which included “the establishment of adult 
reformatories, in conjunction with (1) the indeterminate sentence, (2) a 
mark/classification system, (3) intensive academic and vocational instruc-
tion, (4) constructive labor, (5) humane disciplinary methods, and (6) 
parole.”61 
When Zebulon Brockway became the superintendent of the Elmira 
Reformatory in New York in 1876, he put these principles to the test.62  In 
the Elmira Reformatory, inmates had access to a variety of educational 
programs taught by college professors, lawyers, and public school princi-
pals.63  For the less astute, Elmira offered vocational programs such as 
“tailor cutting, plumbing, telegraphy, and printing.”64  To incentivize 
prisoners to reform themselves, Brockway adopted a graded system, which 
rewarded inmates’ good behavior and participation in vocational and 
educational programs with new privileges and the possibility of early 
release on parole.65  Due to flawed architecture and scant resources, Elmira 
Reformatory was unable to achieve its sweeping aspirations of prisoner 
reformation.66 
 
56. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 17. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 17-18. 
59. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 70. 
60. Rotman, supra note 51, at 173. 
61. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 70-71. 
62. See EDGARDO ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT:  A NEW VIEW ON THE REHABILITATION 
OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 40 (1990). 
63. Id. at 41. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 40. 
66. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 65. 
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During the same period, New York passed legislation providing for 
indeterminate sentences.67  The statute gave “managers of . . . 
reformator[ies]” the discretion to set the length of the offender’s sentence, 
but the sentence had to be within the maximum statutory term for the 
offense.68  Courts, on the other hand, were precluded from limiting the 
duration of the sentence.69  In other words, an offender had two options:  
“be cured, or be kept.”70 
In 1910, Congress established a federal parole system, which 
authorized the use of indeterminate sentencing.71  Under the new system, 
Congress, the judge, and the parole board each played a role in determining 
the length of an offender’s sentence.72  Congress set the maximum sentence 
an offender could serve, the judge imposed a sentenced within the statutory 
range for the offense, and the parole board determined when the offender 
would actually be released.73  Unlike Congress and the parole board, the 
judge had the power to sentence offenders to no time at all.74  With the 
passage of the National Probation Act of 1925, aside from crimes punish-
able by death or life imprisonment, a sentencing judge could opt to suspend 
a sentence.75 
In the 1950s, the “medical model” became the method of choice among 
policymakers.76  Under this model, penologists viewed criminality as a 
disease, which could be treated or cured through individualized treatment 
programs.77  As part of this system, many states had “diagnostic centers,” 
where offenders would be quarantined and classified before being placed 
into an institution.78  Based on these classifications, officials placed inmates 
in individualized treatment programs, which could include educational 
programs, work release, group counseling, and even specialized living units 
designed to treat disruptive inmates, drug addicts, and sex offenders.79  Like 
 
67. See Jeanine M. Schupbach, New York’s System of Indeterminate Sentencing and Parole:  
Should It Be Abolished?, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 403 (1985). 
68. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 18 (1998). 
69. Id. 
70. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 42, at 73 (citing Martin B. Miller, At Hard Labor:  
Rediscovering the 19th Century Prison, in PUNISHMENT AND PENAL DISCIPLINE 79 (T. Platt & P. 
Takgai eds., 1980)). 
71. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 19. 
72. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989). 
73. Id. 
74. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 19. 
75. Id.  
76. Braswell, supra note 21, at 4. 
77. Id. 
78. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 63; see also ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 171. 
79. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 172. 
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the states, the BOP provided several specialized programs: “Asklepieion,” 
which sought to promote self-help attitudes through transactional analysis;80 
“CASE,” which encouraged young offenders to succeed academically; the 
Special Treatment and Rehabilitative Training unit (START), which 
incentivized the most disruptive inmates to maintain good behavior; and 
several drug abuse treatment units, which were established by the Narcotic 
Addicts Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (NARA).81 
While the rehabilitative ideal enjoyed immense support, by the mid-
1970s, many experts started to question the efficacy of the model.82  One 
study by Robert Martinson and his colleagues reviewed 231 studies of 
correctional programs that had been conducted from 1945 to 1967, focusing 
on these programs’ effects on recidivism.83  The programs scrutinized 
included vocational training, educational remediation, and medical pro-
grams.84  After reviewing these studies, Martinson and his research team 
concluded, “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts 
that [had] been reported . . . had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”85  In 
sum, Martinson believed there was “little reason to hope that we have in 
fact found a sure way of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation.”86 
This report was the tipping point for liberals and conservatives who 
already harbored negative sentiments towards the rehabilitation model.87  
Liberals argued racial discrimination in sentencing was an epidemic.88  
Further, liberals contended the uncertainty of these sentences was breeding 
 
80. Transactional analysis (TA) involved a TA leader guiding a group of inmates through 
script analysis, in which inmates identify the effects of their negative thoughts.  CLEMENS 
BARTOLLAS, INTRODUCTION TO CORRECTIONS 323 (1981).  If willing, an inmate could 
participate in a goal-centered treatment regimen that was aimed at helping inmates effectively 
manage self-defeating thoughts.  Id.  The TA program used in the Federal Penitentiary at Marion, 
Illinois was named Asklepieion in reference to the “temple erected in honor of Asklepios, the 
Greek god of healing.”  Id. 
81. ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 173.  Under the NARA, if an offender was “likely to be 
rehabilitated through treatment,” the sentencing court could place the offender into the custody of 
the Attorney General for treatment.  See Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 
89-793, § 4252, 80 Stat. 1438, 1443 (1966), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, § 218(a)(6), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (1984).  If the offender was placed in the Attorney 
General’s custody, the offender’s treatment would last for an indeterminate period of no more than 
ten years.  See id. § 4253. 
82. See Katie Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:  The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1993). 
83. Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 
reprinted in OFFENDER REHABILITATION, supra note 24, at 3, 5. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 6. 
86. Id. at 30. 
87. Cullen & Applegate, supra note 24, at xv. 
88. CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE?  THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN 
PUNISHMENT 220 (2002). 
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anxiety and unrest in the inmate population.89  Conservatives, on the other 
hand, focused on the disparate treatment of offenders who had committed 
similar offenses.90  Because of judges’ unfettered discretion, sentences did 
not correlate to the seriousness of the offense, which often led to unjust 
results.91  Both liberals and conservatives agreed, however, that rehabilit-
ation, as a sentencing rationale, had failed.92 
Although several notable organizations and commissions made 
proposals for reform,93 the most prominent and staunch critic of indeter-
minate sentencing during this movement was Marvin E. Frankel, a federal 
district judge in New York City.94  Frankel bewailed that indeterminate 
sentencing should be “terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes 
devotion to the rule of law.”95  Frankel called for the legislature to create an 
independent sentencing authority that would establish guideline sentences 
and promulgate rules for judges to follow.96  Frankel’s criticism, coupled 
with ongoing federal criminal code reform efforts, paved the way for the 
SRA.97 
B. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 
The SRA can be traced to a 1974 Yale seminar on sentencing.98  Each 
month, members of this seminar would meet and discuss the problems with 
the current sentencing scheme and make recommendations for reform.99  
The monthly sessions culminated in a book, which included a detailed 





92. TODD R. CLEAR, GEORGE F. COLE, & MICHAEL D. REISIG, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 2 
(2003). 
93. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 32.  The Model Penal Code, drafted by the 
American Legal Institute (ALI), provided for moderate changes in judicial sentencing.  Id.  
Although the Code retained rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, the ALI conceded the prison 
setting was not conducive to rehabilitating.  Id.  Likewise, the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency promulgated the Model Sentencing Act, which sought to bring order to the 
sentencing process.  Id.  For example, the Act mandated that judges articulate reasons and factual 
bases for a sentence.  Id.  Similarly, the Brown Commission, enacted by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, argued for appellate review of sentences.  Id. 
94. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 228. 
95. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972). 
96. Id. at 122. 
97. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 68, at 37. 
98. See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform:  Steps Forwards, Steps 
Backwards, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 172 (1995); see also Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 230. 
99. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Preface to TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING 
SYSTEM:  AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM, at ix (1977). 
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independent sentencing commission.100  Although the proposal preserved 
rehabilitation as a sentencing goal, the authors stressed their “wariness of 
most past institutional efforts to rehabilitate offenders.”101  This manuscript 
became the foundation for Senate Bill 2966, a sentencing reform bill 
introduced by Senator Edward M. Kennedy in 1975.102  Despite the 
inclusion of their proposals in the bill, the Yale authors criticized Senate 
Bill 2966 for its many shortcomings, including the bill’s “fail[ure] to define 
its sentencing goals clearly” and its lack of specific guidance for sentencing 
judges.103 
After joining forces with Senator John McClellan of Arkansas, Senator 
Kennedy re-introduced the bill as Senate Bill 1437, which primarily 
focused on criminal code reform, but also included sentencing provi-
sions.104  Like its predecessor, the bill did not distinguish between the four 
sentencing philosophies—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehab-
ilitation.105  The only clear guidance on the goals of sentencing was the pro-
hibition against prison sentences based on rehabilitative considerations.106  
However, even this prohibition would be ineffective “in an exceptional case 
in which imprisonment appears to be the sole means of achieving such 
purpose and in which the court makes specific findings as to that fact.”107  
The accompanying Senate Report further clarified that “this approach to 
rehabilitation efforts is to be avoided as much as possible.”108 
After the bill failed to pass the House, in 1980, both houses of 
Congress developed and reported a bill that included sentencing 
provisions.109  Senate Bill 1722, introduced by Senator Kennedy and 
Senator Strom Thurmond, removed the previous bill’s exception permitting 
judges to impose an indeterminate prison sentence for rehabilitative 
 
100. Id. 
101. PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM:  
AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 47 (1977).  The authors noted the circumstances in which an 
imprisonment term could be used for rehabilitative purposes was limited.  Id.  Such a sentence 
would “be justified only if it [was] more likely than not that the incarceration and its 
accompanying rehabilitative programs [would] actually succeed in ‘rehabilitating’ the offender.”  
Id.  Moreover, the authors enumerated several factors the court would have to consider before 
imposing an imprisonment term for this purpose.  Id. 
102. KENNEDY, supra note 99, at ix. 
103. Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 230. 
104. Id. at 233. 
105. Id. at 239.  
106. Id. at 241 (citing S. 1437, 95th Cong. § 124 (2d Sess. 1978) (proposed tit. 18, § 994(j))). 
107. Id. (quoting S. 1437, 95th Cong. § 124 (1st Sess. 1977) (proposed tit. 18, 994(j))). 
108. S. REP. NO. 95-605, at 1166 (1978). 
109. See Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 225. 
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purposes.110  As Senator Kennedy commented, Congress hotly debated the 
eradication of indeterminate sentencing.111  Ultimately, “complete elimin-
ation” won.112  In contrast, House Bill 6915 did not remove rehabilitation as 
a goal of sentencing.113  Instead, the House contended rehabilitation was a 
permissible sentencing goal.114  Nevertheless, the House warned courts to 
“not give primary consideration to the defendant’s prospects for rehab-
ilitation when deciding whether to incarcerate the offender.”115  Both of 
these bills failed to pass both houses.116 
On October 4, 1984, the SRA finally passed as an omnibus funding 
resolution.117  In the oft-quoted Senate Report 98-225, Congress remarked 
that the indeterminate sentencing model, which tied an offender’s release to 
his successful completion of treatment programs in prison, had failed.118  
Several studies demonstrated the indeterminate scheme was unsuccess-
ful.119  Congress opined parole boards knew too little about human behavior 
to determine whether an offender was rehabilitated.120  In addition, 
Congress feared parole boards’ and judges’ unlimited discretion would 
result in widespread sentencing disparity.121 
To avoid sentencing disparity and to prevent “the employment of a 
term of imprisonment on the sole ground that a prison has a program that 
would be of benefit to the prisoner,” Congress rejected the rehabilitation 
model.122  This did not mean, however, that Congress believed prison 
programs should be eliminated altogether.123  Instead, the availability of 
prison programs could factor into the judge’s recommendation for a certain 
facility.124  Judges could also consider rehabilitation when considering an 
offender’s overall sentence, such as choosing between imposing a term of 
 
110. Id. at 241-42 (citing S. 1722, 96th Cong. § 125 (1st Sess. 1980) (proposed tit. § 994(k)).  
But see S. REP. NO. 96-553, at 1245 (1980) (caveating it is permissible for rehabilitation to be a 
“secondary purpose of the sentencing”). 
111. Edward M. Kennedy, Commentary—The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act and New 
Sentencing Alternatives, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 423, 431 n.34 (1980). 
112. Id. 
113. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1396, at 435 (1980). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 436. 
116. See Stith & Koh, supra note 82, at 225. 
117. See 130 CONG. REC. 29,730 (1984). 
118. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1983). 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
121. See id. at 38. 
122. Id. at 119. 
123. Id.  
124. Id. 
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imprisonment, probation, or fine.125  Overall, Congress stressed that 
rehabilitation should not be the sole purpose for imposing a term of 
imprisonment, but it could be an appropriate consideration when imposing a 
term such as probation or supervised release.126 
C. SENTENCING UNDER THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES 
As part of the SRA, Congress created the United States Sentencing 
Commission, an independent agency within the judicial branch of the 
federal government.127  One of the Commission’s duties is to promulgate 
appropriate guideline sentences for criminal offenses.128  After United 
States v. Booker,129 sentencing courts must consult these Guidelines when 
determining the appropriate sentence for an offense.130  In other words, the 
recommended Guidelines range is just another factor to consider when 
tailoring a sentence.131 
When calculating the Guidelines range for an offense, the sentencing 
court follows approximately seven steps.132  First, the court selects the base 
offense level that matches the offense.133  Second, the court decides whether 
to increase or decrease base level based on “specific offense character-
istics.”134  Third, the court will apply additional adjustments to the base 
level, such as the status of the victim, the offender’s role in the crime, and 
obstruction of justice.135  Fourth, the court will identify which of the six 
“criminal history categories” applies to the offender.136  Fifth, after 
selecting a criminal history category, the court will locate where the offense 
level and criminal history category intersect on the sentencing grid, which 
dictates the sentencing range for the offense.137  Sixth, the court will 
consider an upward or downward departure from the sentencing range.138  
 
125. Id. at 77. 
126. Id. at 76. 
127. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006). 
128. Id. § 994(a)(1). 
129. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
130. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.  (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the 
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”) 
131. Id. 
132. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009). 
133. Id. § 1B1.1(b). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. § 1B1.1(c). 
136. Id. § 1B1.1(f). 
137. Id. § 1B1.1(g). 
138. Id. § 1B1.1(i). 
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Finally, the court will consider any relevant policy statements, commentary, 
or language within the Guidelines that may affect the sentence.139 
On appellate review, there is a rebuttable presumption that a sentence 
properly calculated within the Guidelines range is reasonable.140  A 
departure from the Guidelines range, however, is not presumptively 
unreasonable.141  When reviewing a sentence, an appellate court engages in 
a two-step review of the sentence, reviewing for abuse of discretion.142 
First, the appellate court will determine if the sentencing judge 
committed any procedural errors, “such as failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines 
range.”143  Second, the appellate court will determine if the sentence was 
substantively unreasonable “tak[ing] into account the totality of the 
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines 
range.”144  For example, a sentence may be substantively unreasonable if 
the district court significantly relied on impermissible factors.145  A 
sentencing court abuses its discretion when it commits a procedural error or 
imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence.146 
D. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
After the enactment of the SRA and the promulgation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, a split emerged among circuit courts regarding the 
apparent tension between 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) and § 3553(a)(2)(D).147  On 
one hand, § 3582(a) admonishes sentencing courts to recognize that 
“imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and 
rehabilitation.”148  On the other hand, § 3553(a)(2)(D) directs sentencing 
 
139. Id. 
140. United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007); see also United States v. Robinson, 
516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting the presumption is appropriate “if the court finds that 
the case before it is typical [circuit case]”). 
141. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 n.3 (2007); see also United States v. Solis-
Bermudez, 501 F.3d 882, 884-85 (8th Cir. 2007). 
142. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. United States v. Floyd, 458 F.3d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 2006). 
146. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
147. United States v. Jimenez, 605 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2010). 
148. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006). 
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courts to consider a defendant’s need for “educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”149 
To reconcile these two sections, circuit courts developed two 
approaches.150  The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits held § 3582(a) bars 
courts from imposing a term of imprisonment to promote an offender’s 
rehabilitation, but allows courts to lengthen a sentence in pursuit of this 
goal.151  In reaching this conclusion, these circuit courts construed § 
3582(a) to distinguish between two decisions made by a sentencing court: 
whether to incarcerate and determining the length of an imprisonment 
term.152  While § 3582(a)’s limiting language applied to the imposition of 
an imprisonment term, it did not apply to the decision to lengthen the 
sentence, whether it be within the Guidelines range or an upward 
departure.153  If Congress intended otherwise, these circuit courts believed 
Congress would have explicitly admonished judges to recognize “that 
imprisonment or the length of imprisonment is not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction or rehabilitation.”154 
Conversely, the Third and the D.C. Circuits held § 3582(a) prohibits 
sentencing courts from using rehabilitation as a justification to impose a 
sentence of imprisonment and to determine its length.155  These circuits 
courts believed the perceived conflict between § 3582(a) and § 
3553(a)(2)(D) was illusory.156  In fact, the Third and D.C. Circuits 
contended these two sections work in harmony.157  In allowing sentencing 
courts to consider rehabilitation in the overall sentencing process, these two 
sections combined ensure sentencing courts will not use incarceration as a 
means to facilitate rehabilitation.158  Moreover, these circuits found it 
nonsensical to say the statute prohibits a court from imposing a sentence on 
the basis of rehabilitation, but allows them to lengthen a sentence for that 
impermissible purpose.159  As the D.C. Circuit questioned, “If . . . 
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting rehabilitation,  how 
 
149. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
150. See Jimenez, 605 F.3d at 424. 
151. Id.; United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 629-30 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1994). 
152. See generally In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing the 
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits interpretation of § 3582(a)). 
153. See Duran, 37 F.3d at 561. 
154. Id. 
155. In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d at 859; United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 158 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
156. See Manzella, 475 F.3d at 157. 
157. Id. at 158. 
158. Id. 
159. See In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d at 849. 
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can more imprisonment serve as an appropriate means of promoting 
rehabilitation?”160 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Tapia v. United States, Justice Kagan authored the opinion for the 
Supreme Court, concluding § 3582(a) precludes courts from imposing or 
lengthening a sentence for rehabilitative purposes.161  Justice Sotomayor 
filed a concurring opinion, to which Justice Alito joined.162  Reversing the 
Ninth Circuit, the Court held the district court’s act of lengthening Tapia’s 
sentence so she could participate in RDAP was barred by § 3582(a).163  In 
her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor questioned whether the district court 
had actually violated the proscription set forth in § 3582(a).164 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
First, the Supreme Court provided a brief background of the relevant 
sentencing provisions.165  In light of this statutory background, the Court 
next examined the text of the statute itself.166  Despite finding the statute 
clear and unambiguous, the Court also considered how the legislative 
history and lack of judicial authority to order treatment affected its textual 
reading of the statute.167  Finally, the Court provided guidance to sentencing 
courts on how to avoid running afoul of § 3582(a).168 
1. Statutory Background 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court briefly outlined the background 
of the relevant sentencing provisions.169  Prior to the enactment of the SRA, 
the indeterminate system dominated federal sentencing.170  This system 
gave sentencing courts boundless discretion to choose sentences for federal 
offenses.171  Once the court determined the minimum sentence for the 
offense, the parole board determined how much time the offender would 
 
160. Id. 
161. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (2011). 
162. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
163. Id. at 2392 (majority opinion). 
164. Id. at 2393 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
165. Id. at 2386 (majority opinion). 
166. Id. at 2388. 
167. Id. at 2391-92. 
168. Id. at 2392-93. 
169. Id. at 2386. 
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171. Id. 
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actually serve.172  A good example of how this system operated, the Court 
remarked, was the statutes dealing with the punishment of drug 
offenders.173  Under these statutes, if a judge found a drug offender was 
“likely to be rehabilitated through treatment,” it could confine the offender 
for treatment for an indeterminate period of no more than ten years.174  
After six months of treatment, the Attorney General could recommend the 
offender for early release.175 
Due to sentencing disparities and an overwhelming belief that 
rehabilitation had failed, indeterminate sentencing fell out of favor.176  
Accordingly, Congress enacted the SRA, where it explicitly abandoned 
indeterminate sentencing in favor of guideline sentences.177  The Court 
concluded the enactment of the SRA was in direct response to the over-
whelming perception that rehabilitation could not be reliably induced in the 
prison setting.178 
After discussing this statutory background, the Court noted sentencing 
courts are still required to consider the sentencing factors laid out in § 
3553(a), which includes “the need for the sentence . . .  to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”179  The Court 
clarified, however, that these factors may “apply differently, or even not at 
all, depending on the kind of sentence under consideration.”180  For 
example, the SRA prohibits courts from imposing a term of supervised 
release for retributive purposes.181 
2. Plain Text Analysis 
Turning its attention to the statute at issue, the Court proceeded to 
conduct a plain text analysis of § 3582(a).182  First, the Court examined the 
common definitions of the words “recognize” and “appropriate” in § 
3582(a)’s limiting clause.183  The Court concluded the most natural 
 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 2387 n.3. 




178. Id. at 2391 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983)). 
179. Id. at 2387. 
180. Id. at 2388. 
181. Id.  
182. Id.  
183. Id. 
          
392 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:375 
definition of “recognize” was to “acknowledge or treat as valid.”184  The 
Court also stated something is not “appropriate” if it is not “suitable or 
fitting for a particular purpose.”185 
Using these definitions to interpret § 3582(a), the Court concluded the 
most natural reading of this section “tells courts that they should 
acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting 
rehabilitation.”186  Invited by the Court as amicus curiae to represent the 
government’s position, Professor Stephanos Bibas187 argued “recognizing” 
also means “recall to mind” or “perceive clearly.”188  Under his 
interpretation of the “recognizing” clause, § 3582(a)’s caveat is nothing 
more than a reminder or a guide for sentencing judges’ cognitive 
processes.189  The Court rejected amicus’ statutory construction, reasoning a 
judge would not sentence a person to a term of imprisonment to promote 
rehabilitation if he or she “perceived clearly” that incarceration is an 
inappropriate means for doing so.190 
Citing United States v. Duran, amicus also contended § 3582(a) only 
bars a court’s initial decision to impose a term of imprisonment and does 
not apply when a court is determining the length of the sentence because § 
3582(a) caveat applies only to “imprisonment,” and imprisonment means 
“the act of confining a person.”191  Rejecting this argument, the Court 
pointed out the definition of imprisonment is defined as “[t]he state of being 
confined” or “a period of confinement.”192  Because the definition did not 
distinguish between the decision to incarcerate and the length of incarcer-






187. Id.  Professor Bibas is a law professor and director of the Supreme Court Clinic at the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law.  Stephanos Bibas, PENN LAW, http://www.law.upenn. 
edu/cf/faculty/sbibas/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).  In addition to teaching Criminal Sentencing, 
Bibas has written several articles on the subject.  STEPHANOS BIBAS, CURRICULUM VITAE, 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/sbibas/cv.pdf.  Bibas has served as Amicus 
Curiae on three prior occasions.  Id. 
188. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 14, at 24.  
189. Id. 
190. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at  2388-89.  
191. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 14, at 52. 
192. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2389. 
193. Id. 
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3. Statutory Context and Legislative History 
Although the Court felt the analysis could start and end with the text of 
§ 3582(a), the Court bolstered its analysis by examining the statute’s 
context and legislative history.194  Citing § 994(k) and § 3582(a), which 
directs the Commission and the Court to reject imprisonment as a means of 
promoting rehabilitation, the Court emphatically stated “[e]ach actor at each 
stage in the sentencing process receives the same message:  Do not think 
about prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.”195 
Moreover, the Court noted Congress did not provide sentencing courts 
plenary power to ensure the offender ends up in a facility where rehab-
ilitation services are available, or require the offender to participate in 
them.196  The SRA left these decisions within the discretion of the BOP.197  
In this context, if a judge can increase the length of the sentence to promote 
rehabilitation, an offender can end up with a longer prison term in a facility 
that does not provide the offender with needed treatment.198  Even if an 
offender has access to rehabilitative programs, the sentencing judge cannot 
force an offender to participate in them.199 
The Court determined if Congress wanted to consider rehabilitation 
when imposing a term of imprisonment, it would have given sentencing 
judges the power to ensure the offender participated in rehabilitative 
programs.200  For example, unlike the imposition of a term of imprison-
ment, when a judge is sentencing an offender to either probation or 
supervised release, the SRA grants the judge the power to require the 
offender to participate in rehabilitative programs.201  In those instances, 
Congress explicitly tells sentencing courts to consider rehabilitation as a 
factor in imposing these types of sentences.202  This lack of judicial 
authority, the Court continued, supported the textual conclusion that 
sentencing courts cannot impose or lengthen a term of imprisonment in 
order for the offender to participate in correctional programs.203 
Finally, the Court, citing the key Senate Report accompanying the 
SRA, concluded the legislative history of the SRA suggests Congress was 
 
194. Id. at 2390. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b), (e), (f), 3624(f) (2006); 28 CFR pt. 544, 550 (2010) as 
BOP authority over administering inmate educational, recreational, and vocational programs). 
197. Id. at 2391. 
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trying to prevent judges from sentencing offenders to prison because it had 
some program that might benefit them.204  In the report, Congress 
recognized indeterminate sentencing had resulted in a prisoner’s release 
being conflated with the completion of prison treatment programs.205  While 
Congress debated at length as to whether rehabilitation should be elimin-
ated completely, Congress refused to take that categorical position.206  
Instead, Congress stated, although rehabilitation is an impermissible reason 
to sentence an offender to prison, a court may consider rehabilitative 
concerns when recommending a facility, or “determining whether a 
sanction other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate in a particular 
case.”207 
As a final argument, amicus contended the rehabilitative model 
rejected by the SRA did not include targeted-treatment programs.208  
Instead, the rehabilitative ideal was based on the belief that isolation and 
hard labor alone could reform an offender.209  The Court also rejected this 
argument, stating that prior to the SRA, prison rehabilitation efforts were 
focused on educational, vocational, and counseling programs.210  Consider-
ing the unambiguous language of the statute, its legislative history, and its 
context, the Court held § 3582(a) “prevents a sentencing court from 
imposing or lengthening a prison term because the court thinks an offender 
will benefit from a prison treatment program.”211 
4. Guidance for Sentencing Courts 
In applying the district court’s findings to Tapia’s case, the Supreme 
Court proclaimed it did not disapprove of what the sentencing judge was 
trying to accomplish.212  The Court noted § 3582(a) does not preclude a 
judge from merely discussing what prison rehabilitation programs are 
available and their benefits.213  Likewise, a judge can recommend a facility 
that has a needed treatment program and encourage an offender to 
participate in them.214  But when a sentencing court imposes a lengthier 
prison sentence in order for the defendant to be eligible for a correctional 
 
204. Id. at 2391. 
205. Id. 
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program, the court commits error.215  Here, the Court found the judge’s 
comments suggested he had calculated Tapia’s sentence length to fifty-one 
months so she could qualify for and complete RDAP, which was in 
violation of § 3582(a).216  The Court remanded the case for further 
reconsideration consistent with its opinion.217 
B. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the judgment, but expressed her 
skepticism that the judge had actually violated § 3582(a)’s prohibition in 
this case.218  Justice Sotomayor commented that rehabilitation was only one 
of many factors, including deterrence, the district court used to justify 
lengthening Tapia’s sentence.219  Moreover, Justice Sotomayor noted that, 
at minimum, a thirty-six month sentence would have been sufficient to 
qualify Tapia for RDAP.220  Increasing Tapia’s sentence to fifty-one 
months would have little effect on Tapia’s eligibility.221  Therefore, Justice 
Sotomayor questioned whether the judge based Tapia’s sentence on her 
eligibility for RDAP.222  Given the Ninth Circuit’s stance on the issue and 
some of the sentencing judge’s comments, Justice Sotomayor conceded it 
was unclear whether rehabilitation took precedence in the district court’s 
decision.223 
IV. IMPACT 
Overturning the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court resolved 
a longstanding circuit split regarding the interpretation of § 3582(a).224  
After Tapia, even if a sentencing court believes the defendant will benefit 
from a correctional program, the court cannot impose a term of 
imprisonment or lengthen it so that the defendant can participate in the 
program.225  While the application of Tapia seems straightforward, courts 
have found the line between proper and improper sentencing statements is 
 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 2392-93. 
217. Id. at 2393; see also United States v. Tapia, No. 09-50248, 2011 WL 6091308, at *3 
(9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2011) (finding on remand the district court committed plain error by selecting a 
longer sentence so Tapia could qualify and complete RDAP). 
218. Id. at 2393 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
219. Id. at 2393-94. 




224. See United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1994). 
225. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2392. 
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not so clear.226  In addition, it is unclear whether Tapia’s scope extends 
beyond initial sentencing.227 
A. SENTENCING STATEMENTS:  WHEN DO THEY GO TOO FAR AND 
VIOLATE § 3582(A)? 
As a general matter, a talismanic statement such as, “I’ve got to give 
[the defendant] that length of time to do the programming and the treatment 
and the counselling [sic] . . . that is the reason for [the] sentence,” is a Tapia 
error.228  However, a sentencing court’s mere mention of rehabilitation 
during a sentencing hearing is not sufficient to constitute an error.229  
Whether a sentencing court commits a Tapia error is not always clear.230  
As Justice Sotomayor observed during oral argument, sometimes rehabilita-
tion, deterrence, and incapacitation may be intertwined.231  Extrapolating on 
this issue, in United States v. Kubeczko,232 the Seventh Circuit concluded 
there was no impropriety in a court lengthening a sentence based on the 
concern—whether due to mental illness or addiction—that the defendant is 
likely to commit further crimes upon release such that a longer sentence is 
necessary to protect the public from the defendant’s future offenses.233  To 
illustrate its reasoning, the Seventh Circuit posited two hypothetical 
sentencing statements: 
In one the judge says, “I’m not worried that you’ll commit more 
crimes if I gave you a shorter sentence; I am giving you a long 
sentence to enable you to obtain psychiatric assistance that will 
bring about your complete rehabilitation.”  In the other sentencing 
statement the judge says, “I am going to sentence you to a sentence 
long enough to enable you to obtain psychiatric assistance, 
because . . . you can’t control your violent impulses.”234 
 
226. See infra Part IV.A. 
227. See infra Part IV.B. 
228. United States v. Henderson, 646 F.3d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 2011). 
229. See, e.g., United States v. Blackmon, 662 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding “the 
district court merely pointed out a mathematical flaw in [defendant’s] request” for a lesser 
sentence based on rehabilitative needs, and therefore the sentencing statement did not constitute 
plain error). 
230. See, e.g., United States v. Kubeczko, 660 F.3d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2011). 
231. See Oral Argument at 5:04, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (No.10-5400), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2010/2010_10_5400. 
232. 660 F.3d 260 (7th Cir. 2011). 
233. Kubeczko, 660 F.3d at 262-63. 
234. Id. at 262. 
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The Seventh Circuit contended the first statement, but not the second, 
would violate the statute.235  The Seventh Circuit reasoned the second 
statement is permissible because it is based on the defendant’s need for 
incapacitation; without treatment, the defendant would continue to be a 
danger to the public.236  While the hope the defendant will be rehabilitated 
through prison programs is an impermissible consideration, the fact that the 
defendant’s problem would make him or her more dangerous would be a 
proper consideration.237  This distinction is made even clearer if the judge 
indicates he does not think the defendant is interested in rehabilitation, but 
believes a longer sentence is necessary “to protect the community, promote 
respect for the law, and to provide a just punishment for the offense, all of 
which are permissible sentencing considerations under § 3553(a).”238  
Nevertheless, if the court unambiguously states that the defendant needs a 
longer sentence so he or she can be rehabilitated, the court runs afoul of § 
3582(a).239 
B. TAPIA’S APPLICATION TO RESENTENCING UPON REVOCATION OF 
SUPERVISED RELEASE 
While sentencing judges cannot impose or extend a prison sentence so 
an offender can benefit from rehabilitative programs,240 it is unclear 
whether Tapia’s scope extends beyond the context of initial sentencing.241  
Before Tapia, most circuits held that sentencing judges could consider 
rehabilitative concerns when imposing a prison term at resentencing upon 
revocation of supervised release under § 3583(e), which governs 





237. Id. at 262-63. 
238. Id. 
239. See id. 
240. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011). 
241. See United States v. Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Breland, 647 F.3d 284, 291 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 282 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
242. See Molignaro, 649 F.3d at 3 (citing United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Abeita, 409 F. App’x 2, 4 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Crudup, 461 
F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thornell, 128 
F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 
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In United States v. Molignaro,243 the First Circuit held § 3582(a)’s 
admonition also applied to post-revocation prison terms.244  In its reasoning, 
the First Circuit conceded there were two arguments that made the majority 
view persuasive.  “First, the dog didn’t bark.”245  In face of constant 
litigation on this issue, neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission 
amended the statute or took action through their regulatory power.246  
Second, it is sensible for Congress to allow courts to give a defendant, who 
failed to complete his or her treatment on release, another chance at 
treatment, albeit an unpromising one.247  However, the First Circuit found 
the congressional intent underlying § 3582(a) overshadowed these 
arguments.248  Echoing the reasoning in Tapia, the First Circuit noted 
sentencing courts’ “incapacity speaks volumes.”249  Based on its reading of 
Tapia, the First Circuit concluded this incapacity trumps the omission of the 
limiting language in § 3583(e).250 
A few months later, the Fifth Circuit, without addressing Molignaro, 
held the plain language of § 3583(e) permits courts to consider rehab-
ilitation when resentencing the defendant to a term of imprisonment in 
United States v. Breland.251  In affirming the defendant’s sentence, the Fifth 
Circuit relied on its prior reasoning in United States v. Giddings.252  In 
Giddings, the court recognized § 3583(g), which governs mandatory 
revocation of supervised release, did not contain § 3582(a)’s limiting 
clause.253  In fact, while § 3583(g) did not require the court to consider a 
defendant’s need for rehabilitation, it did not prohibit it either.254  The 
Giddings court also noted both § 3583(c), which governs the general 
imposition of supervised release, and § 3583(e) specifically require the 
court to consider rehabilitation.255 
Equally compelling, the Giddings court pointed out that a sentencing 
judge is not imposing a new term of imprisonment at resentencing.256  Upon 
revocation, the sentencing judge is merely requiring the defendant to serve 
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the rest of his or her supervised release in prison.257  Because a court must 
consider rehabilitative factors when imposing a term of supervised release, 
it follows that, upon revocation, courts can consider these factors so the 
term of imprisonment corresponds with the purposes of the original 
sentence.258 
After reviewing the reasoning in Giddings, the Fifth Circuit in Breland 
also noted nothing in the Tapia opinion suggested its holding would apply 
to revocation of supervised release.259  Rather, the Fifth Circuit pointed out 
the Supreme Court cited § 3583 as a provision that does allow courts to 
consider rehabilitative factors.260  Given the uniform interpretation of § 
3583(e) among the circuits and the plain language of the statute, the Fifth 
Circuit saw no reason to read § 3583(e) any differently from § 3583(g).261  
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held § 3582(a) does not preclude a court from 
considering rehabilitation when resentencing upon revocation of supervised 
release.262 
Recently joining the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Grant263 found sentencing courts’ incapacity to place a defendant in a 
particular prison or force the defendant to join a BOP program outweighed 
the Fifth Circuit’s “cross-referencing” argument.  Looking at the language 
of § 3582(a), the Ninth Circuit concluded the section “appears to embrace 
all sentences of imprisonment.”264  Based on this reasoning, the Ninth 
Circuit held a prison term, whether imposed at initial sentencing or upon 
revocation of supervised release, can only be imposed or lengthened based 
on retributive, deterrence, or incapacitation rationales.265  Although the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a sentencing judge may rightfully believe 
a prison sentence has rehabilitative benefits, “those benefits cannot be the 
reason for imposing it.”266 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Tapia, the Supreme Court held § 3582(a)’s prohibition against 
considering rehabilitation applies both to the decision to incarcerate and to 
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the determination of the length of the prison term.267  While the Court did 
not disapprove of Tapia’s sentence, the Court held the sentencing judge 
went too far in selecting the term of imprisonment to ensure participation in 
the 500-Hour Drug program.268  With its holding, the Supreme Court ended 
the long-running practice of lengthening a defendant’s sentence so he or she 
could participate in correctional programs.269  After this decision, if a 
defendant shows the district court committed a Tapia error, the defendant 
may be entitled to resentencing.270  Although Tapia clearly applies to initial 
sentencing, the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have differing views on 
Tapia’s application to resentencing upon revocation of supervised 
release.271  If the Supreme Court grants certiorari and finds its Tapia 
holding applies to revocation of supervised release, arguments that a 
defendant needs a second chance at rehabilitation in prison would no longer 
be a valid reason for incarceration.272 
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